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Articles
THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER LISBON:
IS THE UGLY DUCKLING A SWAN YET?
JAMES D. DINNAGE*
IN the aftermath of the changes to the European Union (EU) brought
about by the 1992 Treaty on European Union, or Treaty of Maastricht,
J.H.H. Weiler asked whether the new clothes had an emperor. Almost two
decades later, we have, in the Treaty of Lisbon, another apparently signifi-
cant constitutional re-arrangement, and another of Hans Christian Ander-
sen's fairy tales springs to mind. The story of the Ugly Duckling contains
two particular elements of note. First, the ugly duckling obviously always
had the genes of a swan and was never really a duckling. Second, none of
the surprisingly parochial barnyard animals apparently had ever seen a
swan and thus had no idea what this creature in their midst really was.
I. FROM CONSTITUTION TREATY TO CONSTITUTIONAL TREATIES
A. The Confused Citizen
The history of the Communities and the EU is now a sixty-year epic
going back to the foundation of the original Coal and Steel Community,
now expired. We pick up the story in 2002. Over forty years after the
birth of the European (Economic) Community and ten years after the
creation of the separate but connected European Union, and after numer-
ous reforms and frequent setbacks, the Governments of Europe declared
themselves ready to recognize a defining moment, when the process of
gradual integration through "functionalist" institutions matured into the
finality of a constitutional settlement.' By 2004, the work of an intergov-
ernmental conference charged with this task produced a proposal for a
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe that would indeed replace
the founding documents of the European Community and the existing
European Union. Remarkably, perhaps, the Member States signed up
* I am honored and grateful to have the opportunity to acknowledge
Professor John Murphy's distinguished career by contributing to this Festschrift.
John has been my long-time friend and my collaborator with respect to our
casebook on European Union constitutional law. On several occasions we
discussed the template proposed in this Essay, and it will finally find its way into
our casebook via the upcoming third edition to be published in early 2012.
1. The need for finality was invoked in the oft-quoted speech given by the
German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, at Humboldt University in Berlin on
May 12, 2000. SeeJoschka Fischer, Ger. Foreign Minister, From Confederacy to
Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Address at Hum-
boldt University (May 12, 2000).
(409)
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without demur. Some governments felt that this new step was significant
enough to warrant a referendum in their countries, though most did not.
Then, after a "yes" vote in Spain and other ratifications without a popular
vote, the project fell out of the sky in 2005 when the citizens of France and
the Netherlands rejected it. Analysis of the votes showed a variety of rea-
sons given by voters for the rejection in the two countries. According to
the European Commission's survey,2 the reasons given by those who voted
"no" included:
- It will have negative effects on employment3
- The economic situation in France is too weak/there is too
much unemployment in France
- Opposes the national government/certain political parties
- Not enough social Europe
- Too complex
- Does not want Turkey in the European Union
- Lack of information
- I am against Europe/European construction/European
integration
- I do not see what is positive in this text
- The draft goes too far/advances too quickly
- Opposition to further enlargement
- Not democratic enough
- Too technocratic/juridical/too much regulation
- I am against the Bolkestein directive
- I do not want a European political union/a European federal
State/the "United States" of Europe
- The draft does not go far enough
- Loss of national sovereignty
- Europe is too expensive
- Opposition to further enlargement
- Economically speaking, the draft is too liberal (meaning mar-
ket-based)
- The "Yes" campaign was not convincing enough
- This constitution is imposed on us
- The country must first settle its own problems
- I do not trust Brussels
- Loss of national identity
- There is nothing on human rights or on animal rights.
2. European Comm'n, European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France,
at 18, Flash EB171 (June 2005) [hereinafter Flash Eurobarometer], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public-opinion/flash/fll7len.pdf. See generally Gaetane Ri-
card-Nihoul, The French "No" Vote on 29 May 2005: Understanding and Action, NOTRE
EUROPE (Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.notre-europe.eu/fileadmin/IMG/
pdf.
3. In France, at 31% this was by far the greatest reason for rejection. Flash
Eurobarometer, supra note 2, at 17.
410 [Vol. 56: p. 409
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The debate leading up to these votes was, as to be expected, national
in character, and in France at least, a significant overall factor was the
unpopularity of the incumbent government. This seems to have then di-
vided the camps along traditional ideological lines.4 It is evident from the
list of reasons for rejection in both countries that very few had anything
directly to do with the merits of the proposed Constitution Treaty itself.
After this rejection, the Member States retreated. The notion of a
"Constitution for Europe" was quietly extinguished and bundled into a
hastily dug grave. All mention of it in European circles was obliterated.
After a "period of reflection," the reforms of the (not-to-be-mentioned)
treaty were rebranded as a sort of tidying up exercise not requiring a pop-
ular vote after all. They were tucked into the existing framework of trea-
ties via a "reform" treaty that subsequently became known as the Treaty of
Lisbon after its signature in that city on December 13, 2007.
The Lisbon Treaty was actually in all substantive respects the same
proposal as before (establishing a unified organization called the Euro-
pean Union out of the former European Union and European Commu-
nity) but without an entirely new document with a lofty and threatening
title and stripped of the trappings of a "constitution" (a flag, a motto, an
anthem, etc.). Somehow these almost cosmetic changes were supposed to
make all the difference. Instead, the two existing treaties, i.e. The Treaty
on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (EC Treaty) were preserved, but, with the Community abol-
ished and succeeded by the Union, the EC Treaty was renamed as the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (collectively,
the Treaties). At first, it looked like the voters were not fooled. The Con-
stitution of Ireland still required a referendum, and in the first ballot, the
new approach was rejected. But, in reality, and as before, the obscurity of
the proposal played into the hands of the opposition. The "No" camp let
fly with a host of lies, half-truths, and mischaracterizations. People were
encouraged to believe that "Europe" was undemocratic and a threat to
Irish identity, neutrality, and sovereignty. Similar concerns had already
surfaced in Poland, and then in the Czech Republic, where the President,
Vaclav Klaus, compared the EU to the old Soviet Union.5 The German
Constitutional Court struggled to reconcile the proposed changes with the
German Basic Law and the German concept of the sovereign state and
indeed required certain legislative changes before ratification could
proceed.
4. Although, some elements on the left opposed the Treaty based on the ide-
ology apparently embodied in the treaty. See Renaud Dehousse, The Unmaking of a
Constitution: Lessons from the European Referenda, 13 CONSTELLATIONs 151, 153
(2006). The treaty in this regard actually did not vary materially from the market-
based economy endorsed by the EEC Treaty in 1957.
5. In a speech to the European Parliament on February 19, 2009, Mr. Klaus
also questioned the need for the Parliament itself. See Vaclav Klaus, President,
Czech Rep., Address at the European Parliament (Feb. 19, 2009). Needless to say,
the speech was not generally well-received by the audience.
2011] 411
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Then, a second ballot in Ireland the next year produced a remarkable
turnaround. With a more persuasive campaign by the Government, and
in the midst of a severe economic reversal, the people voted by a huge
margin in favor. This time the message was that Ireland needed the
Union; the Irish did not want to end up as a nation on the periphery
potentially falling back into the shadow of the United Kingdom. There
was particular resentment at the involvement in the campaign of the
United Kingdom Independence Party. Was this the sort of ally Ireland
would be left with? No, they wanted to be a positive player in the world's
largest trading bloc. Thank goodness for Brussels.
B. The Root Cause of Hostility
The Communities and the Union have been a success in many ways,
including the single market, the abolition of internal frontiers, the com-
mon currency (perhaps), and, underlying all this, the prevention of armed
conflicts among its members. Indeed, in this latter respect, politicians
who argued for the "Yes" camp during the referendum campaigns on that
ground were derided for scaremongering: in effect, postulating the ridicu-
lous notion that conflict among the Member States was still possible.
Through its program of economic integration the Communities and now
the Union brought a new era of prosperity to Europe. The Lisbon re-
forms enable the new Union to move on to strengthen ties between its
peoples through the construction of an "area of freedom, security and
justice." The Union, even pre-Lisbon, has played important roles in pre-
serving peace outside its borders, and again, the Lisbon reforms will en-
hance these capabilities.
Why then did so many show such disdain or indifference to the consti-
tution proposal? There can be little doubt that the root cause of the rejec-
tion was that most voters did not understand very well what the Union and
the Communities were, how they functioned, or what powers they pos-
sessed, or, more to the point perhaps, did not possess.6 Thus, they were
unable to comprehend the purpose of the proposal on which they were
being asked to vote and indeed why they were being asked to vote on it at
all.7 The Treaties in their pre-constitution form were described, in 2001,
as "confusing, jargon-ridden, occasionally ambiguous, and consistently im-
pervious to ready understanding by the layman and specialist alike."8 The
6. In The Netherlands, according to one reading, this factor may even have
been the immediate reason for a majority of voters. See Dehousse, supra note 4, at
156 (citing Flash Eurobarometer, supra note 2, at 17).
7. Had the treaty been more accessible, it might still have been rejected of
course, but at least the attention of voters could have been more focused on the
proposal itself and abstainers might have been more motivated to vote. In France,
60% of those who did not vote cited the difficulty of understanding the Treaty as
one reason for their abstention. See Flash Eurobarometer, supra note 2, at 31. In
The Netherlands it was 51%.
8. Christopher Beazley, A British View of the European Constitution, in A SimPL-
FIED TRFATY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? 85, 87 (Kim Feus ed., 2001).
412 [Vol. 56: p. 409
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Constitution Treaty, while a great improvement, remained beyond the
reach of most voters. Citizens were confronted with a perpetuation of
many aspects of the pre-existing Treaties with their, by now, heavy use of
euro-jargon and reference to concepts that scarcely related to their daily
lives. Moreover, they were bound to have difficulty in understanding how
the proposed "constitution for Europe" related to their own constitutions.
The root cause should not be equated with the actual reason given.
The point is that because the proposal was so obscure to most voters, it
enabled the "No" camp to diffuse attention away from the proposal and
towards any number of distracting issues: the opposition was left with free
rein to pick and choose any particular article or element as they pleased
on which to vent their opposition. They could play on the fears of the
voters about the implications of "Europe"-a Europe that already existed
and was in many important respects only being consolidated by the new
treaty. Voters were confronted with the option of voting for something
that, at best, they did not well understand, or voting against it based on
whatever particular issue was troubling them. So they did what voters usu-
ally do when they are confused, suspicious, or fearful. They threw it out.
If the Constitution Treaty was difficult to understand, the Lisbon
Treaty, as an amending document that went line-by-line through the ex-
isting Treaties, changing words, sentences, numbering, and order, was
completely impenetrable. And the founding Treaties, as now amended,
while more rational in their organization, still merit the 2001 description,
with over 400 articles, plus a multiplicity of protocols and declarations.
The arrangement of provisions particularly in the TFEU is derivative of its
original form and purpose, as the founding document of the EEC and
then EC. It was focused on more or less precise steps for achieving a com-
mon market, and institutions were set up for that limited purpose. The
TFEU has now completely outgrown that purpose. The TEU tries to set
up a broader constitutional overview but this can seem particularly confus-
ing because it is in places repetitive of TFEU provisions, while some TFEU
provisions (such as the division of competences, or detail relating to the
status of EU citizenship) seem like they really ought to belong in the TEU
as the more generalized constitutional document. The doctrine of "direct
effect," mentioned later on, is not acknowledged. The primacy of EU law
over state law (also discussed later) only gets a nod via a declaration, and
we are still left only with the original sparse texts of the basics of the inter-
nal market-free movement of goods, labor, services, establishment, and
capital-which do no justice at all to the hugely significant case law that
has had such a profound influence on the development of the Union.
The general public continues to have great difficulty in understand-
ing the Union and therefore in engaging with it. It has been built largely
by their governments and bureaucrats and remains remote and seemingly
elitist. In fact, their governments even extol this remoteness as a virtue,
4132011] -
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since it is the only way that the European project has been able to
progress:
[E]ver more bigwigs have stated that the EU's new treaty was de-
liberately made as unintelligible as possible so as to make it easier
to win new powers for Brussels. That was the lesson they drew
from the ill-fated EU constitution when it was voted down by
French and Dutch voters in 2005. There is nothing new in claims
that the EU is seizing power by stealth. What is novel is that they
come from ardent supporters of EU integration. An early case
was Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing, a former French president who
chaired the convention that drafted the constitution. Earlier this
summer, as EU leaders gathered to salvage bits of his wrecked
text, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing publicly declared that the plan was to
"camouflage" the big changes that his constitution had tried to
set out openly. "Public opinion," he said, "will be led to accept,
without realising it, provisions that nobody dared to present
directly."9
Both the attitude of this "European elite" and the complexity of the
Treaties might be at least excusable if the Union still were only an ad-
vanced form of international organization that did not have daily effects
on people's lives. In that case, even the Constitution Treaty probably
should never have been put to a popular vote. On the other hand, if in-
deed the Union now merited a constitution, then its citizens surely were
entitled to a better explanation not only of the document that was
presented to them, but also why it was necessary.10 The need for such expla-
nation has not gone away with the Lisbon reforms since, as already noted,
these were in all material respects the same as those embodied in the ear-
lier proposal.
II. WHAT SORT OF ORGANIZATION IS THE EUROPEAN UNION?
The foundation documents of the Union are international treaties
(and even the constitution proposal itself was an international treaty).
Thus, it is not beyond the bounds of reason to begin an inquiry into the
question posed above by asking whether the Union is, despite its unique
9. Charlemagne, For Your Eyes Only: Why Do So Many European Leaders Favour
Unintelligibility?, THE EcoNOMisT, Aug. 9, 2007.
10. It must be acknowledged that many state constitutions are lengthy and
complex documents also. However, citizens recognize that their state constitution
is the foundation for the organization of their society and so, whether they under-
stand it well or not, they certainly understand the need for it and why they should
be asked to vote on it or on amendments to it. By contrast, the significance of the
EU Constitution was consistently downplayed by governments. Jack Straw, then-
British Foreign Secretary, observed that to call it a constitution was insignificant-
even golf clubs have constitutions. See Neil Walker, Post-National Constitutionalism
and the Problem of Translation, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE
27, 31 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
414 [Vol. 56: p. 409
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attributes, fundamentally still just a very advanced form of international
organization, and as such, ultimately the instrument of its Member States.
Whatever the legal experts may say, this is a notion to which the govern-
ments of the Member States still seem to adhere as a political matter, so it
is important to examine it seriously.
A. Is the Union Merely the Instrument of the Member States?
Article 1 of the TEU post-Lisbon states, "By this Treaty, the HIGH
CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN
UNION . . . on which the Member States confer competences to attain
objectives they have in common. This Treaty marks a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.",1
The elements of this article are first, that the Union is established by
the Member States (describing themselves in the conventional language of
international law and not as the representatives of their peoples). Second,
it declares that the Member States confer competences on the European
Union. What it expressly does not say is that the states thereby transfer
some portion of their sovereign powers to the Union. All they have done,
it seems, is agree that the Union will have the competence to exercise their
collective sovereign powers. Their sovereignty remains intact; it is how it is
exercised that changes. Third, the purpose of this conferral is to pursue
their common objectives; and finally the treaty is another stage in the
longer term project of furthering ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe. Faced with this language, an interpretation of this article to the
effect that the Union is the instrument of the Member States seems justi-
fied. In many respects the concept does indeed reflect the way the Union
actually works as a matter of political reality. We can note the following
features:
- The Member States maintain control over both legislative and
executive authority through the Council. All legislative acts re-
quire approval of that body, the members of which are in real-
ity the Member States themselves.12 Even in areas where the
Union has "exclusive competence" such as competition policy,
11. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Euro-
pean Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 10 [hereinafter TEU].
12. Representation of the states in one of the federal legislative chambers is
not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a federation, witness the composi-
tion of the Bundesrat in the German Constitution and of course the pre-Seven-
teenth Amendment situation in the United States. In the Union, however, the
Member States themselves are really the members of the Council since their repre-
sentatives vary according to the subject matter of the meeting. See TEU, supra note
11, art. 16; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 238, Mar. 25,
1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 153-54 [hereinafter TFEU]. The Council also serves as
an important element of executive power, which certainly places it in a different
position from the Bundesrat.
2011] 415
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the Member States are very much involved through powers del-
egated back to them from the Union.
- Most significant Union legislative action occurs through har-
monization-that is, alignment of national laws rather than
creation of a federal body of law. The instrument of harmoni-
zation is the form of legislation known as a directive.
- Below a very high level, all executive action has to occur
through the medium of the executive power of the Member
States.
- Where the Union is authorized to pursue a policy (agriculture,
competition, commercial, foreign and security, transport), it
does so by common policies or common rules.1 3 A similar ap-
proach is now becoming evident in the evolution of the direc-
tive. Lisbon has confirmed that the Union now has the ability
to adopt implementing measures at the Union level where uni-
form action-not "Union" action-is required. 14
- However peripheral, Lisbon now has recognized the formal
participation of Member States' legislative bodies in the Union
legislative process.
- Although it is an autonomous legal system, Union law only
takes effect within the legal systems of the Member States. It
does not exist as a "federal" body of law external to them.
- The Union depends on the Member States for its sources of
revenue. It has no power of taxation.' 5
Explaining the Union in this way does not immediately account for
the existence of the European Parliament. The Parliament exists as an
institution outside the legislative framework of the Member States.16 To
fit it into a notion of the Union as merely an international organization
would require us to believe that it is not in fact a democratic body repre-
senting the people of Europe as a whole. Some would claim that the poor
turnout for election proves this point. Moreover, the Parliament does not
perform the role that people would expect of such a body. It has no exis-
13. The demise of the name "Community" produced something of a discon-
nect in this regard, since that term more accurately correlates with the notion of
common action.
14. TFEU, supra note 12, art. 291.
15. This lack of taxation power has been criticized as a reason why citizens are
seemingly mostly disinterested in European Parliament Elections and the activities
of the Parliament. See, e.g., Philip Allott, Epilogue: Europe and the Dream of Reason, in
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 202, 221. Al-
lott urges the conferral of a taxation power using a nice twist of a familiar mantra:
"No representation without taxation." One should note, however, that the most
salient weakness of the Parliament is that its elections do not result in the forma-
tion of a government, similar to the mid-term elections in the United States, which
have a historically low turnout.
16. See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No.
92-308DC, Apr. 9, 1992, Rec. 55 (Fr.) (re-ratifying European Union Treaty).
[Vol. 56: p. 409416
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tence independent of the rest of the structure: It cannot function on its
own. It does not house a parliamentary government. It has no European
civil service to which it can look to enforce the laws that it adopts. On the
contrary, the Member States alone can do that. It is dependent on propos-
als from the Commission for legislative initiatives (with some qualifica-
tions). It still does not have a uniform electoral process (although it is
now required to draw up a plan for approval by the Council). And it is still
dependent on the cooperation of the Council-the Member States in ef-
fect-for the passage of any Union measure.
It is also very much the case that even the post-Lisbon Union has not
arrived at a finality as a constitutional order. It has flexibilities in many
directions: the euro is the currency of only seventeen Member States; the
UK and Ireland are not part of the "Schengen" arrangements regarding
freedom of travel within the Union; and Poland and the UK have opt-outs
(of dubious value, one might add) with respect to the full application of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Treaties recognize the possibility
of multi-speed integration through the Enhanced Co-operation provisions
(although these have never been used as such). Moreover, the continued
process of enlargement of membership contributes to this lack of finality
in the post-Lisbon Union.
There were, however, certain specific features of the Community, now
inherited by the Union, that are hard to reconcile with the proposition
that the Union is merely the "instrument" of the Member States.
First, over the course of its history the individual citizen has become
progressively more engaged directly in the affairs of the Community,
bypassing and indeed opposing the Member States. Thus, in the pre-Lis-
bon Community and now in the post-Lisbon Union:
- Individuals have the right as a matter of Union law (and there-
fore not derived from state law) to invoke at least certain provi-
sions of the Treaties and directives in order to have conflicting
state laws declared inapplicable;17
- Individuals have rights to recover compensation from a state
that breaches Union law;18
- Regulations and some treaty provisions create obligations for
individuals;19
- Individuals now enjoy the status of Union citizenship;20 and
- In their interaction with Union law, individuals enjoy the pro-
tection of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and, to the ex-
tent that national law is implicated, those rights override it.
17. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
18. Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
19. See TFEU, supra note 12, arts. 101-02 (competition law); id. art. 157 (equal
pay for men and women); id. art. 288 (effect of regulations).
20. Id. art. 20.
2011] 417
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On a different plane, the introduction of the euro, supplanting one
of the most fundamental attributes of sovereignty and national identity,
has changed the relationship of citizens to the Union (or at least some of
them) in both psychological and economic terms.
Second, notwithstanding the weaknesses noted above, it is a fact that
through the European Parliament, Europe's citizens can participate di-
rectly, and outside the state structure, in the adoption of European legisla-
tion and other important activities including the appointment of the
Commission.2 1 I will revert to this in more detail later on.
Third, to assert that the Member States remain in control through the
pivotal role of the Council is to overlook the essentially European nature
of that body. Most areas of EU action now are subject to qualified majority
voting, which is today declared to be the norm.22 For a sovereign state to
be bound by a decision it has voted against is not in itself altogether unu-
sual in the international order. But in the case of the Union, the result is
that its citizens are also bound by, or derive rights under, legislative acts.
Essentially then, the will of the majority has the force of law throughout
the Union and the principle of exclusive territoial sovereignty of the dis-
senting states yields to the collective sovereignty with which the Union is
endowed. Even amongst the majority this may be the case to the extent
that compromises have been accepted to get a measure passed.
Fourth, while it must be acknowledged that the Member States re-
main "masters of the Treaties," thus theoretically having the power to
change the Union in any way they please, this process requires unanimity
among all twenty-seven Member States and is now subject to the participa-
tion of the Parliament.2 3
Such considerations surely suggest that the Union is more than just
an instrument of the Member States. The participation of the peoples of
Europe, and the nature of the legislative process are manifestations in
some sense of an independent will beyond just the will of the Member
States.
This then prompts us to move to the next stage of the inquiry. Al-
though many assert that the Union is "sui generis," this is a singularly use-
less expression if we are trying to explain it to the non-expert. It is more
helpful to frame the issue in terms of political structures that are at least to
some degree familiar. Of the various structures available, the notions of
confederation and federation seem the most probable. 24
21. Id. art. 289.
22. TEU, supra note 11, art. 16(3). The Member States still attempt to reach
consensus as a practical matter, but this does not detract from the importance of
the principle of majority voting.
23. Id. art. 48.
24. See also Francis Snyder, The Unfinished Constitution of the European Union, in
EUROPEAN CONSTn-UTIONALIsM BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 55, 57.
418 [ol. 56: p. 409
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B. Is the Union a Confederation?
I would note in the first place that, while the term "confederation" is
sometimes used to describe the Union, this description proves to be un-
helpful because there is no agreed definitional boundary to the term. On
the one hand, it is not necessarily indistinguishable from the notion of
federation. Consider the case of the Swiss Confederation, which has a fed-
eral constitution. On the other hand, many confederations of the past can-
not be considered as having been more than loose alliances of sovereign
states. Professor Wheare says of the term:
[It] may be used to describe a form of association between gov-
ernments whereby they set up a common organization to regu-
late matters of common concern but retain to themselves, to a
greater or less degree, some control over this common organiza-
tion. It is often doubtful whether the common organization can
be said to possess sufficient power to be called a government, and
in that case it may be doubtful sometimes whether the document
which establishes this common organization should be called a
"Constitution"-it might properly be called an agreement, a cov-
enant, or a treaty.25
At first sight, Wheare's description does seem to fit the European
Union as it is the creature of (what were originally at least) international
treaties, not of a constitution. The Union does not have a government, at
least not one capable of functioning in the way that a state government
does. And it does appear that the Member States continue to maintain
significant control over the Union.
At the same time, the EU has some important features that do not fit
the description, nor do they match what are generally considered histori-
cal examples of confederations, such as the original Confederation of
United States of 1778 or the German Confederation that replaced the
Holy Roman Empire.
Alexander Hamilton, commenting in The Federalist on the original
Confederation of the United States, observed, "the concurrence of thir-
teen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the
complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the
Union."2 6 By that measure, the EU is actually more developed than a con-
federation. The existence of qualified majority voting takes it beyond the
typical confederal structure Hamilton describes and certainly beyond the
arrangements found in the 1778 Articles of Confederation of the United
States.
Yet, the Union also falls short of the classic confederation model, be-
cause it does not serve the one purpose that normally propels states into a
25. K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONs 23-24 (2d ed. 1967).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
1992).
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confederation. This is surely to provide common security and the man-
agement of foreign affairs. To the contrary, Article 4 of the TEU declares
in no uncertain terms that "[njational security remains the sole responsi-
bility of each Member State,"2 7 and the Member States continue to exist as
subjects of international law. The Union has no standing in organizations
where membership depends on statehood, such as the United Nations,
although the Member States are required to advance its policies. Admit-
tedly, the Union has displaced the Member States in the conduct of inter-
national affairs within the scope of the Treaties. Lisbon introduced a new
office of "President," and formalized the role of the High Representative
for foreign affairs. It has even provided for the creation of a Union diplo-
matic corps ("External Action Service"). 28 The Member States are re-
quired to coordinate their policies within the United Nations and other
international bodies.
For all that, neither the President's nor the High Representative's
roles are quite what they sound. The President is not a head of state;
instead, the role exists to marshal the Member States within the European
Council-it is this body that might be viewed as a collective president for
the Union. The High Representative is given the task of representing the
Union, but clearly does not have authority to speak for the Member States
outside of the Union's competences or authorized policies, while any ex-
ecutive action remains dependent on the Member States.
More fundamentally, the critical point that Wheare was making was
that confederations, being generally rather loose organizations of sover-
eign nations, cannot be said to have a founding document that can be
called a constitution.2 9 Thus, to assert that the Union is a confederation
does not enable us to determine whether it is no longer just an interna-
tional organization or whether it deserves a constitution (and more likely
would lead us to conclude that it does not).
C. Is the Union a Federation?
At first glance, we might conclude that the Union does not fit the
federation model, for a very simple reason: It is generally understood that
the nation state has sovereign power over its territory, while international
law addresses the relations between those nation states.30 This is the con-
temporary "normal."3 In current usage, then, the term "federation" de-
27. TEU, supra note 11, art. 4.
28. Id. art. 27(3).
29. WHEARE, supra note 25, at 24.
30. This can be described as the so-called Westphalian system, based on the
Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Its continued viability has been the subject of much
debate. See, e.g., RE-ENVIsIONING SovEREicrNY': THE END OF WESTPHALIA? (Trudy
Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2008).
31. As Bardo Fassbender states, "Images of sovereignty constructed in past
centuries remain, much longer than was expected, or hoped for, in 1945. It seems
that the power of those images was underestimated. . . ." Bardo Fassbender, Sover-
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scribes the internal organization of a sovereign nation state, such as
Switzerland, Germany, or the United States. As such, a federal state is no
different in international law than a unitary state.3 2 It cannot be claimed
that the Union is a state,3 3 so it would follow that it cannot be a federation.
Yet, the existence in the Union of a two-tier legislative and policy/
decision-making structure (Union/states) surely requires us to try a little
harder. Is it really necessary that the notion of federation must always
imply only the internal structure of a state? I do not believe so. The abso-
lutely essential characteristic of a federation is surely that there is an allo-
cation of sovereign powers between the federal authority and the several
states ("co-ordinate powers"). Such allocation necessarily requires both a
single source of ultimate sovereign power and the primacy of the federal
authority.34 While it is easier to locate a single source of sovereign power
within a state, it does not follow that it cannot exist outside of one.3 5
1. The Starting Point: The Primacy of European Law
The search for a single source of sovereignty for both the states and
the Union begins with the legal history of the European Community as the
eignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in SovEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 115,
143 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
32. For a detailed exposition and critique of this viewpoint, see R. SCHOTZE,
FROM DUAL TO COOPERATrvE FEDERALISM: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN
LAw (2009).
33. There are some, particularly the more vocal opponents of the Union, who
would assert that as a result of Lisbon, the Union has now become a state. Georg
Sorensen tells us that a sovereign state requires a territory, a people, and a govern-
ment. It is not disputed that the Union does not possess any territory-its legisla-
tion and executive acts have be to be carried through the medium of the
administrations of the Member States. For the same reason it cannot be said to
have a government. The requirement for a "people" might seem more easily satis-
fied, because nationals of the Member States automatically enjoy the status of
Union citizenship. However, the requirement is not really satisfied because the
critical connection between the individual and the state is nationality, not "citizen-
ship." Furthermore, Union citizenship is imperfect: Member States retain the
right to refuse entry or residence to non-nationals based on grounds such as na-
tional security, or the likelihood that they will become a burden on state resources
(in the case of persons not enjoying the status of a worker or self-employed
person).
34. Wheare says of this requirement:
Neither [state nor federal legislature] is subordinate to the other; both
are co-ordinate ... . In a federal Constitution the legislatures both of the
whole country and of its parts are limited in their powers and indepen-
dent of each other. Consequently they must not be able, acting alone, to
alter the Constitution so far at any rate as the distribution of powers be-
tween them is concerned. They are not subordinate to each other but
they must all be subordinate to the Constitution.
WHEARE, supra note 25, at 19, 22.
35. Much thought has been given to this issue. It has brought into question
the underlying established suppositions on which sovereignty rests. Is the system
of state sovereignty still a valid description of the world order? Are states really
sovereign?
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predecessor of the Union in its post-Lisbon form. Those familiar with the
history of the Community know well that the European Court of Justice
(the Court or ECJ) long ago ruled that conflicts between state laws and
Community (Union) laws needed to be resolved in favor of Union law.
In a famous passage, the Court declared that Community (now
Union) law takes primacy, or has supremacy, over even subsequent na-
tional laws based on the need to assure the consistent application of Com-
munity law:
In truth, the executive strength of Community laws cannot vary
from one State to the other in favour of later internal laws with-
out endangering the realization of the aims envisaged by the
Treaty in Article 5 [of the original EEC Treaty], and giving rise to
a discrimination prohibited by Article 7 [of the same]. In any
case, the obligations undertaken under the Treaty creating the
European Community would not be unconditional, but merely
potential if they could be affected by subsequent legislative acts
of the signatories of the Treaty.36
We could perhaps still try to downplay the doctrine of supremacy by
asserting that it merely creates a new rule within each Member State juris-
diction giving priority to Union laws. But this would not ensure the consis-
tency of application of EU law that underlies the ECJ's reasoning. It
necessarily must exist as an autonomous body of law. Moreover, it inevita-
bly requires that EU law override even national constitutions. The ECJ in-
deed confirmed this point in the Internationale Handelsgesellchaft3 7 case:
Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law to judge the
validity of instruments promulgated by Community institutions
would have the effect of harming the unity and efficacy of Com-
munity law. The validity of such instruments can only be judged
in the light of Community law. In fact, the law born from the
Treaty, the issue of an autonomous source, could not, by its very
nature, have the courts opposing to it rules of national law of any
nature whatever without losing its Community character and
without the legal basis of the Community itself being put in ques-
tion. Therefore the validity of a Community instrument or its
effect within a member-State cannot be affected by allegations
that it strikes at either the fundamental rights as formulated in
that State's constitution or the principles of a national constitu-
tional structure.
36. CASE 6/64, COSTA v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
37. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vor-
ratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
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In Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,3 8 the
ECJ had also ruled that individuals had the right as a matter of Commu-
nity law to invoke certain provisions of the EEC Treaty against the applica-
bility of national laws that conflicted with those provisions. This also was
of a Community character in the ECJ's view: it was not dependent on what
each national constitution said about the direct effect of treaties in na-
tional law.
The doctrine of supremacy can only survive if it is derived from a
grant of power beyond the acts or constitutions of the Member States (the
"autonomous source" referred to by the Court). For how could the gov-
ernments of the Member States ever have had the power to grant to the
Union the right to override their own constitutions? They could not give
what they did not have. Even though some constitutions do permit inter-
national law to prevail over national laws-even subsequent laws-this is
only by permission of the constitution itself. Moreover, not all Member
State constitutions have such provisions.
Additionally, the European Court must itself derive its legitimacy
from such a source, for how otherwise would its rulings have the legal
effect necessary to achieve the unity it describes as indispensable? It is
logically impossible that it could be subordinated to any of the courts of
the Member States.39
The doctrine of supremacy satisfies one leg of the federation defini-
tion. Because this principle could not have been approved by the Member
States under the authority of their own constitutions, it leads us immedi-
ately to the logical conclusion that the Union derives its powers from a
source other than; or at least additional to, an act of the Member States,
and that source must be the same source as that which granted legitimacy
to their own constitutions, for otherwise there would be only conflict. In a
democracy, this source obviously is "the people."4 0
So where might we look for approval by the people?
2. The EEC Treaty
Was the EEC Treaty really more than just an agreement between sov-
ereign states? Might we actually conclude that the governments that
signed it were representing their people rather than their states in a simi-
lar manner to the representatives of the thirteen American states who
drafted the 1787 Constitution?
38. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
39. This is characterized as a question of who has competence to decide on
how competence should be allocated, often described by the German shorthand
"Kompetenz-Kompeten."
40. In democratic societies this is a given, but it does not exclude that the
nature of the legitimizing act could be something other than a single "constitu-
tional moment."
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In its Van Gend decision, the ECJ declared that:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common
market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to inter-
ested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more
than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the
Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is
also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institu-
tions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects
Member States and also their citizens. Furthermore, it must be
noted that the nationals of the States brought together in the
Community are called upon to cooperate in the functioning of
this Community through the intermediary of the European Par-
liament and the Economic and Social Committee. 41
These views were presented as an essentially logical outcome of the
original EEC Treaty contents, particularly its stated goals and its mecha-
nisms for creating direct legal relationships with citizens through the di-
rect applicability of Community regulations and decisions addressed to
private parties. Although it would be a distortion of history to assert that
the framers of the EEC Treaty actually thought of themselves as taking
part in a European constitutional convention back in 1957, yet the treaty
language undeniably manifested a consciousness of something beyond a
mere compact between nation states. The same references to the peoples
of Europe appear in the subsequent EC Treaty and the post-Lisbon TEU
and TFEU.
Pre-Lisbon Treaty language was not at any rate inconsistent with a
view that "the people" had somehow had a hand in the creation of the
European Community. In the post-Amsterdam Treaty (1997) version of
the EC Treaty, Article 5 provided that "[t]he Community shall act within
the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty."42 By referencing
the source of powers as being the "Treaty," the language is, in that specific
context, actually neutral as to who is conferring such powers.
That position seems at first sight to be contradicted by the post-Lis-
bon language of the TEU, which in Article 1 very explicitly refers to com-
petences conferred by the Member States.43 On one reading, this would
arguably preclude the entire supremacy doctrine since it seems to assert
that the grant of powers to the Union is attributable only to an act of the
Member States. As we have seen, supremacy as articulated by the ECJ
clearly implies some form of consent by the people outside of the legal
41. Van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. at 12 (emphasis added).
42. The original EEC Treaty made no reference to powers or competences
being conferred on the Community itself (although Article 4 speaks of conferral of
powers on the institutions).
43. See TEU, supra note 11, art. 1; see also id. art. 5(2) (explicitly inserting
words "by the Member States").
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framework of the Member States. Three factors suggest a different
interpretation:
- For the first time we have an affirmation of sorts in a treaty
document that supremacy is part of EU Law-in the form of
the Council's opinion set out in Declaration 17.44 So,
whatever the significance of the subtle language change in Ar-
ticle 1 (and 5) of the post-Lisbon TEU, it would make no sense
to read it as creating a limitation on the doctrine of
supremacy.
- The Member States surely no longer had the right, just by
amending the language of the treaty, to take back the sover-
eign powers that had already accrued to the Union and that
could only be returned to them by some further act of "the
People."
- The TEU is explicit that candidate Member States must adopt
the "acquis communautaire" (accumulated achievements of the
Community, now Union).45 Such a requirement would make
no sense if the existing Member States were not themselves
bound by the acquis including of course the doctrine of
supremacy.
Perhaps, then, we should make sense of this language by reading the
reference to the conferral of competences by the Member States as simply
expressing the concept that the Union's sovereign powers necessarily en-
44. Declaration 17 states:
The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law
adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the
law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case
law.
The Conference has also decided to attach as an Annex to this Final Act
the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of EC law as set
out in 11197/07 (JUR 260):
Opinion of the Council Legal Semice of 22 June 2007
It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy
of EC law is a cornerstone principle of Community law. Accord-
ing to the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific nature
of the European Community. At the time of the first judgment
of this established case law (Costa/ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 6/
641) there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the
case today. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be
included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the
existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court
of Justice.
Final Act, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 231, 256 [hereinafter Declaration 17] (footnote
omitted).
45. TEU, supra note 11, art. 2, 1 5. An oblique reference to the concept of
the general acquis communautaire also appears in Protocol Nos. 21 and 22.
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tail the surrender of competences by the Member States, for that is where
they resided before their transfer. 46
It has been asserted that the original EEC Treaty itself contained the
genes of an eventual constitution.4 7 It was always intended to evolve into
something that would embody its declared aim of pursuing an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe. But, despite the treaty language and
the Court's interpretation, are we really convinced that we can attribute
the signature of the EEC Treaty or its successors to an act of the people?
Where else might we look for involvement of the people? The answer is to
be found in the very factors that the Court used to justify its reasoning in
support of supremacy and direct effect.
3. The European Parliament
I have already noted the involvement of the people as a whole in the
work of the Union through the European Parliament. The Parliament
started out as an assembly of delegates from national parliaments. It
gained the right to be directly elected by the citizens of Europe in 197648
and the first elections took place in 1979. Almost immediately, it took on
the Council and the Commission over agricultural spending in exercise of
its increased budgetary powers.49 It subsequently began to make its voice
heard in other ways even though, until the Single European Act of 1986,
its powers remained largely those of consultation in the adoption of laws
by the Council. From that date, it saw a stepwise increase in its legislative
powers, which now entail the ability to block EU legislation, thus overrid-
ing the will of the Member States acting in the Council. One may also
note its rights with respect to the appointment of the Commission and the
adoption finally in 2007 of a statute that gave it the power to regulate the
pay and conditions of its Members.5 0 It now commands the respect of the
other institutions as well as of world leaders who have chosen to make
speeches in that forum as a way of addressing Europeans as a whole. Even
46. This surrender of competences operates in the same way that the several
states must have surrendered powers to the United States by execution and ratifica-
tion of the U.S. Constitution.
47. The fledgling was always going to be a swan (whatever a swan is). I thank
KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW (2001), who men-
tions Trevor Hartley's foreshadowing of this metaphor in his article, The European
Court, judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union, where he de-
scribed the most activist ECJ judges' views that the EEC Treaty had been "geneti-
cally coded to develop into the constitution of a fully-fledged federation." Trevor
Hartley, The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European
Union, 112 LAw Q. REv. 95, 107 (1996).
48. Council Decision 76/787 and Act of Sept. 20, 1976, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1.
49. See Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and of the Treaty Establishing a Single Council
and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 22, 1970, 1971 J.O.
(L 2) 1 (becoming fully effective in 1975).
50. This has been vividly documented in SIR JULIAN PRIESTLEY, Six BATTLES
THAT SHAPED EUROPE'S PARLIAMENT (2008).
426 [Vol. 56: p. 409
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss3/2
THE EUROPEAN UNION ArrER LISBON
those who are vociferous opponents of the Union have chosen to voice
their opposition by seeking election to the Parliament, as witness for ex-
ample the United Kingdom Independence Party and the right wing
groups from central Europe. Despite its weaknesses, already noted, the
Parliament is indeed the medium through which the people of Europe
can influence and direct the Union (including now submission of peti-
tions for legislative action) and it is now making ever greater efforts to
educate the people about itself and what it can do for them.
The growth of the Parliament's power and influence could not have
occurred without the consent of the governments of the Member States, of
course, but their willingness to cede power has been driven by the de-
mands from interest groups of many kinds for increased democratic con-
trol over Union activities. Once democratic rights have been acquired, it
becomes impossible to take them away. The process is irreversible for as
long as the Union itself continues to exist.
4. Assertion of EU Legal Rights
Private parties have not been slow to assert the rights granted them by
the Treaties and under EU legislation, both against their governments and
in the courts of the Member States. These rights, as we saw earlier, are
extensive. In addition to the ability to invoke the provisions of the Trea-
ties on free movement within the internal market, individuals can rely on
their EU citizenship status and other fundamental rights where their gov-
ernments are implementing Union law. They may also have damages
claims against Member States that commit serious breaches of EU law. Na-
tional courts have not always been enthusiastic supporters of this trend"
and indeed, surely if put to the ultimate test, they would still favor their
own constitution over Union law. Yet they have gone out of their way to
avoid such confrontations by all kinds of legal devices including interpre-
tation, constitutional amendments, and the creation of new legal doc-
trines.52 They might even go so far as to accept the subordination of their
constitution as a practical matter, recognizing however that in the case of
an eventual insoluble conflict, their Member State could withdraw from
the Union.5 3
5. Motivations: Why Would the Member States Want to Give Up Sovereign
Powers?
Within the Union, one could of course point to the astonishing eco-
nomic and societal advances that the Union has enabled for the benefit of
51. See ALTER, supra note 47. This work is a masterful study as to how the
process has worked on the whole to reinforce the doctrine of supremacy over the
last thirty-five years or so.
52. See id.
53. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [Council of State] Nov. 5, 1996, Orfinger, No. 62.922,
http://www.conseildetat.be (Belg.).
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its citizens. But the aspirations voiced in the preamble of both Treaties
regarding an ever closer Union reflect a more profound, if sometimes re-
luctant, realization that the concept of the sovereign state is outmoded for
people who in reality share so much common heritage and live in such
close proximity to each other.54 The original initiative of the European
Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and then of the EEC and European
Atomic Energy Community Treaties was a pro-active reaction to the appal-
ling death and destruction of two European wars. These wars were the
nemesis of the nation state for Europeans. The initial reaction ("this must
never happen again") has now mutated into an affirmative justification for
a unified Europe based on respect for and mutual understanding of na-
tional differences.5 5 As the post-war generation gives way to those who
have no memory of the earlier terrible conflicts, there is no suggestion
that the Union has become unnecessary, indeed quite the contrary.
External forces increasingly are forcing European states to act together
even in areas where they might not want to go. This was evidenced in
quite a remarkable way by the sovereign debt and banking crises of 2009
and 2010. For, in order to shore up the single currency, the Member
States of the eurozone took steps to provide financial support to
threatened countries that were in principle prohibited by the Treaties.5 6 Al-
though many commentators foresee the forced withdrawal of some mem-
bers from the eurozone, this is not an acceptable outcome for the Union.
The Treaties do not permit it, so technically a state in such a predicament
would have to withdraw from the Union altogether.5 7 It is far more likely
that a solution will be found that creates a degree of fiscal discipline in-
tended to prevent such crises in the future while maintaining a short-term
mechanism for dealing with the ongoing difficulties of some countries.
6. The Effect of Lisbon
The pre-Lisbon history of the Communities already permitted us to
conclude that they possessed the key characteristics of a federation. Yet,
for as long as the above analysis was applied to the pre-Lisbon structure,
the term "federation" still seemed rather far-fetched, even though the ba-
sic logic was the same. The Community (as the most "federal" of the pre-
Lisbon "pillars" of the Union) was an organization with a limited purpose.
54. This might be seen as a modem reflection of the pre-Westphalian order,
where the peoples of Europe were often connected or divided by continent-wide
forces that pre-dated the existence of the nation state: religion; the proprietary
nature of sovereign power interlinked by marriage; and culture, geography, and
climate.
55. For an eloquent exposition of this principle, see J.H.H. Weiler, In Defense
of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
BEYOND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 7. The concept of mutual respect has deep
roots in the philosophical constructs of Immanuel Kant.
56. See TFEU, supra note 12, art. 125. However, some support for the action
might be found in TFEU art. 122.
57. TEU Article 50(1) does now permit withdrawal from the Union.
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It did not formally exhibit the normal attributes of a federal power. For
example, there was nothing in the EC Treaty specifically describing its law-
making powers as "legislative": there was no clearly defined division of
competences; and it did not have an official "head of state" since the Euro-
pean Council was a Union body only, not a Community institution. More-
over, the Treaties contained no explicit evidence of the doctrine of EU law
primacy.
Lisbon has changed all this. The fusion of the former Union and the
Community into the new Union extends the reach of Union competence
(however limited) beyond the original purpose of the Community so that,
today, it has a much more generalized federal power at least in the legisla-
tive sphere. The TFEU now formally enumerates and categorizes the pow-
ers of the Union, and there is a clear definition of what constitutes a
legislative act of the Union. The European Parliament's participation in
legislation has been greatly broadened and generalized. And, as noted
above, the Treaties now contain at least a grudging acknowledgment of
the doctrine of the primacy of EU law in the form of Declaration 17.58
Perhaps of the most profound importance is the introduction into EU
law of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is significant in at least
two ways.
First, it is a Union act of some sort. Although originally drawn up
more than ten years earlier by the Union, it was formally "adopted" by
signature and proclamation of the Council, Commission, and Parliament
on the day before signature of the Lisbon Treaty.59 This form of act, not
provided for in the Treaties, represents a form of autonomy of action on
the part of the Union on a matter of fundamental constitutional impor-
tance for European citizens. Since the Charter overrides secondary Union
legislation and legal acts, as well as the acts of the Member States in the
implementation of Union law, it can arguably be viewed as the first consti-
tutional act of the Union itself.60
Second, the creation of a catalogue of rights on par with the EU Trea-
ties ought finally to dispel objections to Union sovereignty-particularly
from Germany-on the grounds that the Union's existence outside the
state constitutional structure would deprive their citizens of fundamental
rights protection over a wide body of law that creates obligations for them.
There was always a certain degree of discomfort with the ECJ's position
58. See Declaration 17, supra note 44.
59. As the Parliament itself states: "This event provides a legal basis for the
article which refers to the Charter in the EU Reform Treaty (the Lisbon Treaty)."
Proclamation of the Charter ofFundamental Rights by the Three European Institutions, EUR.
PARLIAMENT (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
type=IM-PRESS&reference=20071210BRI14639&secondRef=ITEM-005-EN&format
=XML&language=EN. The Charter had originally been proclaimed in a somewhat
similar manner at the European Council meeting in Nice on December 7, 2000,
but was not endorsed at that time by a Treaty amendment.
60. Inevitably there are caveats. Per Protocol No. 30, the Charter has a modi-
fied scope of application in the United Kingdom and Poland.
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that fundamental rights were in any event always part of the EU legal sys-
tem. This was perceived in some quarters to fall somewhat short of the
quality of protection available in the Member States. Indeed, the Court's
ability to elaborate on what those rights are is essentially limited to those
rights that could affect the legality of EU legal acts or implementing mea-
sures of the Member States and does not obviously enable affirmative de-
scriptions of rights such as the right to vote in parliamentary elections. In
other words, the Charter is necessarily more than just a summary of case
law. By enshrining these rights in a separate document, the proclamation
has made them accessible to, and indeed the property of, the population
at large.
I would note, too, that the requirement, now enshrined in the Trea-
ties, for the Union to accede to the European Convention on Human
Rights61 closes the gap between the extra-constitutional protection af-
forded by the convention to citizens in each Member State (in varying
degrees) and the absence of such protection at the Union level.
D. Conclusion
All in all, there is plenty in the history of the last forty-odd years to
permit us to validate retrospectively the Court's seminal language in Van
Gend and Costa-that the original EEC Treaty was more than a compact
between the Member States. Admittedly we are missing the "act of the
people" or "constitutional moment" that would give us the certainty we
would perhaps rather have. Qualitatively we do not have the power of a
majority vote. One would have to admit that for the most part, Europe's
citizens have merely acquiesced rather than taken an active role. Yet, the
flow of power from national governments to the citizens of Europe acting
within the European Union framework of laws and institutions has allowed
the people, to the extent that they so wish, to become active participants
in the dispersal of their (ultimate) sovereignty between their national gov-
ernments and the Union. If one is presented with the option of denying
that this makes any difference, or of accepting that the Union and the
Member States as a practical matter today operate within a system of co-
ordinate sovereignties sanctioned in some measure by the people, surely
the latter is the better conclusion. (One might perhaps even venture to
suggest that these developments provide a retroactive mandate to the orig-
inal framers of the EEC Treaty to act on behalf of the people. That would
then give us our constitutional act.) I have acknowledged that the Union
does not fit the notion of a "federation" as the term is used conventionally
today. Perhaps to avoid confusion, we might call it an international, or
supranational, federation.
61. See TEU, supra note 11, art. 6, 2.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEMPLATE
The nature of federations is that they require a formal legal structure
to manage the complexities that arise in a system of divided sovereignty.
In other words, they need a constitution. So the European Union ought
to have one. Unfortunately, with the demise of the Constitution Treaty,
there is no document that overtly calls itself the Constitution of the Union.
What we have instead are the TEU and the TFEU. 62 Though much im-
proved after Lisbon, the organization and technical complexity of these
Treaties remain serious obstacles to any kind of popular understanding.
Valiant attempts have been made, particularly by the European Com-
mission, to describe the Union in a narrative form as a means of aiding
popular understanding. Experience in teaching the subject has told me
that these efforts produce only confusion. What students actually need is a
point of reference that advances the ability to compare the Union with
familiar constitutional forms. This requires an educational tool that ex-
tracts the key constitutional tenets and reorganizes them so that they look
more like a federal constitution.6 3 This is what I propose: a "constitutional
template" that strips out unnecessary detail, and re-orders the text into
something that actually reads like a constitution.
There is of course no generic form of federal constitution on which we
can draw as a model. Every constitution is unique. Some are, in their
original form at least, brief (such as the United States), others are extraor-
dinarily lengthy, and even at their inception, given to inordinate detail,
such as the Constitution of India. Most have acquired an accretion of
sometimes entirely unsuitable subject matter for a constitution due to
amendments over time.64 Some federal constitutions are almost unitary in
their operation (Wheare cited Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina as examples
of such at the time of writing6 5 ). Some are a rather confusing mixture of
federal and loose confederal arrangements, such as the Canadian Consti-
tution. Even the more pure examples (such as the United States, Ger-
many, Switzerland) are far from uniform in their formal treatment of the
relationship between federal and state authority (not to mention how that
62. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is of course also now a foundational
document declared to have equal weight with the TEU and TFEU, but as already
noted, its legal existence and effects are dependent on its incorporation into EU
law through the Treaties.
63. A previous attempt (in 2001) at simplifying the Treaties was offered by the
European University Institute at the request of the Commission. This was repro-
duced in A SIMPLIFIED TREATY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION, published by the Federal
Trust for Education and Research. The EUI proposal did not have the benefits of
the organizational changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It therefore lacked
some of the key constitutional clarifications including the definition of a legislative
act and the enumeration of competences.
64. Witness the Swiss Constitution, which contains provisions relating to a
consumption tax on motor fuels and the promotion of Swiss film making; or, in
the case of the United States, the Prohibition Amendments.
65. See WHEARE, supra note 25, at 22.
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relationship varies in practice over time). The German Constitution
(Grundgesetz) might seem a logical choice since, like the EU, it embodies a
form of cooperative federalism, i.e., involvement of the states (Ldnder) in
the federal legislative process (through the Bundesrat). In various respects,
particularly the allocation of competences, it is clearly the model for the
European Union Treaties. Structurally, however, it reflects a choice of
parliamentary government. By comparison, the Union does not have a
"government," while at the same time it does possess legislative, policy
making (executive), and judicial functions.
The United States Constitution (in its original form) might also serve
as a potential model. 66 Apart from its strong federal structure, it contains
probably the purist constitutional embodiment of the separation of pow-
ers. Adopting this concept provides an excellent analytical tool for under-
standing the Union's institutional roles and powers, even if applied to an
organization that displays no evidence of the concept.6 7
In the end, we cannot really base a template on any particular model
because the Union is indeed unique. However, federal constitutions do
exhibit commonality in describing the three branches of government
whether there is a formal separation of powers or not. They also necessa-
rily specify how powers are divided between federal and state authorities,
and they lay out rules for relationships among the constituent states.
More generally, as foundational documents, they speak in terms of pow-
ers, rights, and duties.
In the case of the EU, the Treaties mix up the truly constitutional
aspects with lengthy digressions into descriptions of policies, provisions for
establishing the internal market, and all sorts of detailed matters such as
the exact form of majority required in a given case, all of which detracts
greatly from their ability to serve as a robust constitutional statement. In
rearranging and simplifying them so that they speak more like a constitu-
tion-in terms of powers, rights, and duties-my proposed template pro-
duces a significantly alternative perspective. Unfortunately, space
considerations have prevented the inclusion of the template itself as part
of this Essay.
The template rearranges the two Treaties into one document with
nine basic themes represented by nine articles. It includes some summa-
ries of case law where Treaty provisions no longer are sufficient to convey
the significance of the Court's decisions. Otherwise it mostly uses Treaty
66. I confess some self-interest here. As a teacher of EU law to American law
students, I find it particularly helpful to draw comparisons with U.S. constitutional
precedents.
67. Put in somewhat more forceful terms by Vibert, speaking of the pre-Lis-
bon texts: "[C]larifying principles, such as the separation of powers or a parliamen-
tary fusion of powers or even the separation of the judicial (or quasi-judicial) from
other functions, are conspicuous by their absence." Frank Vibert, Re-organisation of
the Treaties: The Failure to Clarify the EU's Constitutional Set-Up, in A SIMPLIFIED TREATY
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?, supra note 8, at 43. This aspect has not been altered as
a result of Lisbon.
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language, but stripped of detail. For example, it does not need to repeat
all the provisions that elaborate on the basic allocation of powers. Nor
does it need to repeat the precise form of legislative procedure (majority,
qualified majority, unanimous votes). These are of course important mat-
ters, but since all relevant Treaty provisions are cross-referenced, the
reader can retrieve the second-tier detail as necessary.
Article 1: Foundations of the European Union. This article contains an
explanation about the Union itself, including its origins, principles, pur-
pose, and membership. This might be viewed in part as a rather extensive
equivalent of the Preamble to the United States Constitution. It declares
the principle of conferral, faithfully-if regrettably-emphasizing the
Member States' continued insistence that the Union is dependent on the
grant of power by the Member States and its role as a means to further
their purposes. Yet it incorporates also the language from the decision of
the ECJ in the Van Gend case where it spoke of institutions "endowed with
sovereign rights"68 and in the Costa case where it spoke of the "transfer of
powers" to the Community.6 9 The article also lists the institutions and
other bodies that provide the Union with its own stand-alone structure
and organization. A description of the foundations of the Union necessa-
rily should include also a statement as to its legal autonomy as evidenced
by the primacy of Union law and the existence of the Union as a separate
legal person able to receive transfer of sovereign rights from the Member
States.
Article 2: The Components of Union Law. This article describes the vari-
ous sources of EU law. It deals first with the Treaties themselves. It notes
the legal equality of the Charter on Fundamental Rights while recognizing
that the Charter was not an act of the Member States. It makes clear also
that the Charter applies within the scope of EU law and does not bind the
Member States except when implementing EU law, thus demonstrating
that there is no "Fourteenth Amendment" set of Union constitutional
rights that are applicable outside the Union context (though we might
stretch the notion of that context). The provisions on how the Treaties
can be amended also speak to the degree of control exercised by the
Member States. Then, the article addresses legislative, rulemaking, and
executive acts-regulations, directives, decisions, and treaties.
Article 3: The Union's Legislature. This article contains a description of
the EU legislature-the composition, procedures, and functions of the
two principal institutions involved: the Parliament and the Council. (The
role of the Commission as initiator is mentioned; however, the composi-
tion of that institution is found in the next article, since the Commission is
primarily an executive body.) The role of the Member States in the Coun-
cil emphasizes their ability to exercise tight control over the EU legislative
68. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belast-
ingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12.
69. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
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process. At the same time, the existence of qualified majority voting on
laws that affect their citizens supports the truly European (Union) nature
of Council acts. The juxtaposition of this with the provisions addressing
the Parliament's composition and powers brings out the contrasts between
the two institutions. The article describes also the rather complicated
processes for adopting legislative acts either through an ordinary or a spe-
cial procedure.
Article 4: Executive Powers. The executive powers described here con-
trast very clearly with those of sovereign state constitutions, for it is plain
that there is no unified executive power, and therefore no government in
the conventional sense. This article describes the numerous institutions
and officers that make up the "Executive" and their powers of action.
Most of their activity involves policy making in defined areas; these bodies
have almost no executive power in the administrative sense. To under-
stand how Union law is implemented, it is vital to include the role of the
Member States in this picture, since they are responsible for virtually all
execution activity. That only serves to emphasize that the Union may have
a federal legislature, but in general does not have a full federal executive
beyond policy and decision making powers.
Article 5: judicial Powers. In addressing the judicial power, the limited
function of the Court of Justice of the European Union is made clear.
Again it is important to address the role of the courts of the Member
States as an integral feature of the EU system, which of course underscores
the lack of any such judicial power vested in the Union itself.
Article 6: Division of Competences Between the Union and the Member States.
The various powers attributed to the United States Congress in the United
States Constitution find a sort of parallel here with a detailed description
of various kinds of competences conferred on the Union. Two contrasts
can be made. First, in the EU, the competences are conferred on the
Union rather than on the legislative body. The reason for this is that the
competences are not necessarily legislative-for example, the Common
Foreign and Security Policy is described as a Union competence but legis-
lative action is specifically prohibited. Second, the TFEU draws a distinc-
tion between exclusive, shared, and supportive competences. This actually
mirrors in a specific way the United States doctrine of preemption in its
various iterations over the decades.
Article 7: Treaty Limitations on the Exercise of Member State Competences.
This article describes the limitations imposed on the Member States to
preserve the EU's internal market. Again, it is helpful to contrast this ap-
proach with the general conferral on the United States Congress of pow-
ers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The detailed provisions
relating to the preservation of the internal market found in the TFEU
might be viewed as a detailed exposition of aspects of the United States
dormant commerce clause doctrine transposed to the EU; it also serves to
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emphasize the vital role of the Member States themselves in achieving the
integration of their economies.
Article 8: Rights and Duties of the Individual Under Union Law. This arti-
cle begins by describing the status of EU citizenship and the more detailed
rights attaching to those who exercise economic activity. It then proceeds
to lay out the rights and obligations of the individual under Union law. In
the EU system a detailed description of rights and duties under the Trea-
ties and Union legislation is necessary to demonstrate that Union law is
not by any means pervasive-EU laws dovetail with the laws of the Member
States rather than standing separate from them, as they would in a federal
system.
Article 9: Relations Between the Member States. This article contains vari-
ous provisions dealing with the relationship among the Member States as
continuing sovereign powers. This includes the now rather infamous pro-
vision prohibiting Member States from bailing each other out of financial
difficulties. Also included is a sort of full faith and credit provision and
specific obligations of the Member States to resolve differences related to
the Treaties within the Union court structure (but not other differences,
which may be resolved under international law in other forums).
IV. WHAT COMES NEXT?
Lisbon has clearly turned the ugly duckling into a more mature and
complete creature of some kind. The template highlights its strengths
and its weaknesses, particularly as regards the absence of an EU govern-
ment. Can it survive in this form? Or will it necessarily have to continue
to grow and mature? And if it does, will it retain its uniqueness or eventu-
ally settle down as a conventional federation?
I do not believe we have achieved finality, but we have probably
reached the limits of integration based on intergovernmental treaties. Po-
litical union, proposed in 2011 by German Chancellor Merkel as the solu-
tion to the euro crisis, ought surely to be endorsed by the people of
Europe.
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